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Abstract 
Some fifty years after its creation EU competition policy remains firmly entrenched as one 
of the most developed examples of supranational governance within the European Union. 
Although  there  has  been  a  marked  increase  in  interest  among  political  scientists  in 
competition policy in recent years there are still gaps in terms of overall coverage. One area 
that has been largely overlooked centres on cartels. Cartel policy has emerged as a highly 
salient issue and main priority of the Commission’s competition policy since the late 1990s.  
Certainly, the recent restructuring of the EU cartel enforcement regime, the imposition of 
ever higher fines  and a determined EU Competition Commissioner have fuelled growing 
media  attention  while new  notices  and  regulations  increasingly  occupy  the interests  and 
minds of practitioners. The European Commission has constantly extended its activities on 
the  competition  policy  front  and  its  increasingly  aggressive  strategies  to  combat  cartels 
provides  political  scientists  with  a  fascinating  case  study  of  governance  in  action  and 
illustrates  the  ways  –  such  as  leniency  programmes,  higher  fines,  enhanced  and  better 
equipped resources as well as internal reorganisation  in which the European regulator is 
pursuing such conspiracies. This article traces the evolution and development of EU cartel 
policy since its inception to its decussis mirabilis after 1999 and assesses the Commission’s 
strategies and considers just to what extent the European Commission is winning its war 
against business cartelisation.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE BATTLEGROUND 
 
Some fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome there is ample scope to 
debate the achievements, near misses and failures of the European Union (EU). One 
aspect is undeniable, namely the priority and centrality of the competition principle 
throughout the history of the European integration process and its influence on the 
domestic competition regimes of the EU member states. Although fewer areas of 
European public policy may seem to have been as widely researched, debated and 
analysed  than  European  Union  (EU)  competition  policy  a  degree  of  caution  is 
immediately  required  for  closer  inspection  reveals  that  interest  in  this  particular 
policy area has stemmed mainly from economics (including Bishop, 1993; Estrin and  
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Holmes, 1998; Motta, 2004) and law (including Goyder, 2003; Sufrin and Jones, 
2008  and  Whish,  2003).  Most  political  scientists  studying  the  EU  albeit  with  a 
handful of exceptions (Cini and McGowan, 2009; McGowan and Wilks, 1995; Doern 
and Wilks, 1996; Wilks, 1999) have tended to either overlook this field of enquiry or 
dismiss  its  relevance  altogether.  The  complexity  and  seemingly  impenetrable 
labyrinth of legal case law and economic analyses of competition regulation may in 
part explain this seeming reticence to explore competition but such a situation is 
simply no longer defensible.  
Politics  matters  in  competition  regulation  and  surfaces  in  relation  to 
institutional  design  and  powers;  issues  of  transparency;  degrees  of  politicisation; 
discretionary abilities and questions of legitimacy in the decision making process. 
EU  competition  policy  has  long  represented  one  of  the  few  areas  where  the 
Commission  is  not  only  responsible  for  direct  policy  implementation  but  also 
possesses wide discretionary powers as both a regulator and an enforcer of policy. 
Fortunately there are now strong signs that these barriers are finally being broken 
down as a new generation of researchers (Büthe and Swank, 2007; Damro; 2003; 
Doleys,  2007;  Lehmkuhl,  2008;  Leucht;  2008,  Seidel,  2007;  Warzoulet,  2007, 
Wigger,  2008)  shed  greater  and  welcome  light  into  the  origins,  institutions  and 
workings of EU competition policy.   
Still, from a political science perspective there has been extremely little work 
done  on  the  two  core  aspects  of  anti-trust,  namely  cartels  and  monopolies.  This 
article starts to redress this omission by examining cartel policy. Cartels are now 
universally  `recognised  as  the  `most  aggressive  violation  of  competition  law’ 
(OECD,  1998).  Cartelbusting  has  been  prioritised  as  the  key  element  of  the 
Commission’s  competition  policy  over  the  course  of  the  last  two  decades  and 
particularly under the last three competition Commissioners, Karel van Miert 1993-
9),  Mario  Monti,  1999-2004)  and  Neelie  Kroes,  2004-present).
1  All three have 
stressed the importance of  battling cartels as  a means of  defending  consumers 
(Kroes, 2008).  This  article  explores  the  Commission’s  role  and  strategies  in  its 
pursuit, identification and termination of cartel arrangements.  
  Cartels represent safe havens for companies to escape and prevent competition 
and  are  generally  held  today  to  represent  the  most  pernicious  form  of  anti-
competitive behaviour. They are normally global in nature and arise when companies 
participate  in  `deliberate,  highly  organised  and  covert  collaborative’  (Harding  and 
Joshua, 2003:1) practices that have been agreed by a number of independent firms from 
the  same  of  similar  sphere  of  economic  activity.  Secret  horizontal  agreements that 
divide markets, fix prices and prevent newcomers from entering the market embody the 
classic  shape  of  a  collusive  agreement.  Cartels  in  the  contemporary  world  are 
generally recognised as problematic because they have been primarily designed to 
serve and work in the interests of their members and not the consumer or the overall 
health of the economy. Kroes (Kroes 2006a) summed this up neatly, `cartels strike a 
killer blow at the heart of economic activity. This makes it harder for us to deliver 
the Lisbon goals of high growth, job creation and innovation’. They work to the 
detriment of the consumer through the imposition of higher prices.
2  
                     
1  Monti  described  cartels  as  a  `cancer’  on  the  European  economy  in  the  XXXI  Report  on 
Competition Policy 2001, European Commission, 2002, p.4 
2  In  its  2005  report  on  hard  core  cartels  the  OECD  noted  that  collusion  resulted  in  significant 
percentage increase in prices. In Japan it was estimated that cartels raised prices by on average 16.5 
percent, in Sweden and Finland by around 20 per cent and in the United States there were examples of 
price increases of the magnitude of some 60-70 percent.   
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In the medium to long run cartels will always enjoy higher (illegal profits) than 
otherwise would be the case in the face of open competition.
3 Recourse to cartelization 
benefits the companies concerned as a means  of extracting  higher rents from their 
customers but such covert operations in preventing competition, thereby limit the need 
for innovation. The profit maximisation incentive ensures that cartels remain very much 
an endemic reality in the modern world. Concerns have also been raised about the 
connections between economic power and political power.
 4 Condemnation of cartel 
agreements has become the norm. In the last decade competition regulators in both the 
EU and the US have intensified their determination to hunt and break-up as many 
cartel agreements that can be unearthed as possible. The difficulties of such a task 
should not be underestimated and the regulators are constantly engaged in battling a 
seeming  propensity  on  the  part  of  the  business  world  for  cartelisation.  Indeed, 
viewed from a longer term perspective this article depicts the Commission’s struggle 
as a series of battles that can be interpreted as an ongoing cartel war.   
The paucity of political science literature in this area is unfortunate for the 
pursuit of cartels opens up a truly fascinating world of `dawn raids’ and intrigue 
where secretive agreements are concocted in smoke filled rooms, in luxury holiday 
resorts and have even been subject to covert taping (see Connor, 2001) by the FBI in 
the USA
5. In the first half of 2008 alone the European Commission raided the offices 
of a very prestigious list of companies (such as Unilever, Proctor and Gamble, 
Lufthansa, and  Lloyds  Reg ister to name but a few) in their search for cartels 
(Financial Times, 30-June 2008; Irish Times, 21/06/2008). 
EU cartel policy has  developed in an incremental fashion and has become 
over time increasingly proactive and combative. The Commission’s current resolve is 
displayed in  a number  of strategies  and reforms  since 2000  that include  internal 
organisational changes within DG Competition, the adoption of new administrative 
rules under Regulation 1/2003, refinements to the leniency programme, a new and 
tougher  Notice  (June  2006)  on  fining  infringements  and  efforts  to  foster  greater 
international co-operation as well as a number of more innovative mechanisms and 
tools such as its 2008 White Paper on Private Actions. The stakes and costs in these 
cartel wars have been raised. It is not just co-incidence that the highest fines in EU 
cartel  history  have  all  occurred  in  the  last  decade,  though  whether  high  is  high 
enough  remains  an  issue.  The  Commission  possesses  considerable  discretion  in 
setting  the  fines  and  has  opted  to  shed  more  transparency  on  how  and  why  it 
calculates the actual fine. Fines form a part of a deliberate strategy to deter cartel 
formation.  Yet,  no  matter  how  laudable  the  goal  of  eradicating  cartels may  be  it 
remains an onerous task that continually challenges the energies and resources of all 
anti-trust regulators. How the regulators respond and pursue cartelisation ultimately 
                     
3 The economic gains are difficult to quantify and vary from case to case.  
4 US antitrust has always displayed an aversion towards the concentration of economic power and 
questioned its actual impact on notions and concepts of democracy if economic power is in the hands 
of a few powerful players. 
5 In the Lysine cartel the FBI managed to record as series of meeting attended by executives from the 
world’s five major lysine producers. Lysine itself is an amino acid and is essential for human nutrition 
and development but cannot be manufactured by the body. For this reason, lysine must be obtained 
from food. The meetings were all secret and were carefully staged to avoid rousing any suspicion 
especially as one of their main customers (the poultry industry) was holing a conference in the same 
town. As the meeting began several jokes were made about who would fill the empty seats as they 
waited for the other members of the cartel to arrive. Some of the replies states their customers and one 
even said  it  was  for the FBI. Little did they  know  as FBI agents posed as hotel employees and 
recorded everything that took place.  
 
4 
determines the scale, intensity and number of such anti-competitive practices at least in 
theory.  Can  they  in  practice  created  sufficient  deterrents  to  ever  overcome  the 
attraction of cartelisation?
6  
  Judging just how successful an enforcement agency the Commission is, depends 
on a number of factors that include how many cartels it unearths, how many fines it 
imposes  and  how  many  potential  arrangements  it  deters.  Although  statistics  are 
available for the first two we will never be in a position to provide an answer on the EU 
rules as a deterrent. It is practically impossible to speak with the firms concerned and 
thus all reference points relate to cartels that have been unearthed. As onlookers we  will 
simply never be in a position to know enough information about the scale and scope of 
cartelization  or  the  strategies  of  the  firms  involved  but  we  can  make  general 
assumptions about the nature and degree of such anti-competitive activities from cartels 
that have already been detected.  That said researchers should also avoid the danger of 
relying on the Commission’s hype in its own assessment of its strategies.   
EU cartel policy provides a number of avenues for exploration and this paper 
focuses specifically on the Commission’s role and response over the last five decades to 
cartelisation.  It  demonstrates  how  the  Commission  has  constantly  expanded  its 
competences, adapted its approaches and continually sought to refine its strategies to 
combat cartel proliferation. This paper provides an historical overview of the four 
phases of EU cartel policy and illustrates how the Commission has steadily become 
more active through new Notices and Guidelines in its pursuit of cartels. It pays most 
attention to the most recent phase after 1999 and both identifies and explores how far 
the  latest  reforms,  administrative  developments  and  internal  restructuring  have 
placed  the  Commission  in  a  position  to  effectively  combat  or  at  least  control 
cartelization. 
 
DECLARING `WAR’ ON THE CARTELS 
 
Cartels have long represented an established aspect of commercial activity. They 
were  particularly  pronounced  as  an  essential,  accepted  and  even  government 
orchestrated feature of business activity in German speaking Europe throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century (Gerber, 1998). Such practices have been traced 
even as far back as Ancient Egypt (Herlitzka, 1963: 121). Cartels have impacted on 
the operation of markets and the positions of other actors and traders. Whether such 
impact might be termed negative or positive is open for debate. Any comparative and 
historical examination reveals that perceptions (ranging from toleration, agnosticism 
to  outright  hostility)  have  differed  from  state  to  state  over  time  (McGowan, 
forthcoming). The propensity towards cartels today may often be driven as much by 
cultural  norms  and  historical  tradition  as  much  as  by  economic  benefits.  Yet, 
perceptions changed dramatically after 1945 when cartels were generally perceived 
as undesirable and led to the creation of the first domestic competition regimes firstly 
in the United Kingdom (1948) and in West Germany (1957).  
                     
6 In exploring EU cartel policy the academic researcher relies very much for primary material 
on a number of official publications (such as the Commission’s annual competition policy report, DG 
Competition’s Competition Policy Newsletter and information rich web-site as well and Court rulings) 
and on interviews with officials from DG Competition. Commission information provides statistics on 
the formal decisions, the number of firms involved in each case, the level of the fines and information 
on where and to whom leniency notices have been issued. The researcher also needs to be able to digest 
the existing range of secondary sources that extend across the disciplines of economics, history, law and 
politics.  
  
 
5 
  The origins of EU cartel policy have to be understood in the context of three 
factors;  the  imperative  of  the  drive  for  the  realisation  of  a  single  market,  the 
historical context that shaped policy after 1945 and the influence and leading role of 
the US experience on the European regimes (Leucht, 2008; Schulze and Hoeren, 
2000). Cartels were identified as an immediate target from the outset when Article 81 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  Treaty  specifically  prohibited  all 
agreements `which may affect trade between member states and which have as their 
object, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market’.
7  In  retrospect,  the  decision  by  the  six  founding  EEC  member  states  to 
commit themselves to competition discipline and simultaneously recognise the logic 
of a supranational dimension is significant given the unfamiliarity for the majority 
with  anti-trust.  It  is  also  worth  recalling  that  Member  State  positions  on  the 
competition policy rules certainly varied and there was a tussle between France, the 
Netherlands and West Germany over both the meaning of competition policy and 
also differing approaches on policy management.  
  Nevertheless, political consensus was reached on the inclusion of competition 
policy in the EEC Treaty (Buch-Hansen, 2008) and further agreement in the Council 
established DG Competition’s legal competence to operate as an autonomous and 
quasi-judicial  policy  making  institution  under  Regulation  17/62.  It  equipped  DG 
Competition with exclusive powers of investigation (including the infamous `dawn 
raids’)  into  suspected  violations  of  the  EU’s  competition  rules  and  enabled  DG 
Competition to codify, exempt and impose fines on offending firms. It is important to 
stress that these fines had an upper threshold of not more than 10% of the company’s 
annual turnover. More significantly in terms of governance, Regulation 17 identified 
the Commission as the principal actor in the administration and implementation of 
competition  policy decision  making  and assigned it the roles  of judge, jury, and 
executioner. In hindsight the Member States had created a powerful supranational 
agent (Seidel, 2007) which has continually advanced its power through the adoption 
of guidelines and notices and in so doing has altered the terms of the principle/agent 
relationship (Lehmkuhl, 2008). The decision to initiate an EU competition regime 
heralded the advance of a Community legal order that would in time ensure strong 
degrees of convergence on the realisation of a European cartel policy.
8  
  Although cartels were identified over fifty years ago by the EEC Treaty as the 
first and primary target of the EU’s competition policy order, the EU cartel regime took 
time to form and its enforcement until the 1980s has been described as hesitant, patchy 
and largely ineffectual. It is never always a straightforward task to pinpoint specific 
chronological turning points or periods in any policy’s development, but this article 
suggests four periods of development for EU cartel policy. In each the position of DG 
COMP and cartel policy developments can be examined with reference to both the 
substantive  and  the  procedural  regimes.  Accounting  for  internal  changes  is  one 
aspect of competition policy that is generally well covered (Wilks and McGowan, 
1996),  whereas  there  has  been  considerably  less  attention  paid  to  the  external 
variables.  Any  examination  into  the  evolution  of  EU  cartel  policy  cannot  be 
                     
7 It should be noted that some types of agreement (and this to some extent reflects earlier more 
sympathetic  perceptions)  were  entitled  to  exemptions  from  the  EU  competition  rules  where 
agreements contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods, promote technical and 
economic progress or ensure that consumers reaped considerable benefits. Prior to 1 May 2004 such 
exemptions under 81(3) were solely at the Commission’s discretion to bestow if an agreement’s beneficial 
effects were judged to outweigh any detrimental impact on competition. 
8 See point 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Official Journal of the European Communities, L1/1, 4, 1, 2003.  
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completely  separated  from  developments  at  Member  State  level.  This  allows 
recognition of the varieties of capitalism literature (Albert, 1993) which emphasises 
the  spectrum  of  capitalist  models  across  Europe  and  the  variable  impact  of 
competition policy (see Wigger, 2008) on liberal, co-ordinated, state and transitional 
economies. Policy development must be considered against changes and events in 
the wider economic and societal spheres. Wigger does this in an innovative manner 
by adopting a critical economy perspective to the development of EU competition 
policy in which she traces the impact of Ordo-liberalism, embedded liberalism and 
neo-liberalism  on  the  evolution  of  the  competition  regime  and  especially  on 
Commission thinking (Wigger and Nölke, 2007). It is not the intention here to retrace 
this particular wider narrative here, but readers are strongly urged to consult such 
emerging literature. How far can the Commission really operate a single cartel policy 
when  so  many  different  cartel  traditions  have  prevailed  and  continue  to  exist  at 
member state level?   
 
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN CARTEL POLICY 
 
This  article  places  the  first  phase of activity to the 1960s  and early 1970s.  This 
period  was  largely  exploratory  in  nature  as  the  Commission  sought  to  bed  in, 
appreciate its powers and gain experience. The second is a continuation of the first 
but required the Commission to readjust its thinking in the face of the economic 
downturn and recession that from 1973 until the mid 1980s. The third covers the re-
launch  of  the  integration  process  through  the  Singe  European  Act  of  1987  and 
specifically the single market project until the end of the 1990s. The final period runs 
from around 1999 when the first serious discussions about the reform of cartel policy 
occurred.  These  debates  centred  on  discussions  about  modernisation  and 
decentralisation that led to the quiet revolution that is encapsulated by Regulation 
1/2003  and reflected a  new dynamism  within DG Competition  to  combat cartels 
more effectively through, for example, the levying of higher fines and a series of 
policy innovations. Each period is now considered briefly in turn.  
 
The Four Incremental Phases of the Commission’s Anti-Cartel Engagement 
 
Period 1: 1962-72, Surveying the Terrain and the `Phoney War’     
(Reg17/62, move to own initiative investigations, first fines) 
Commission style: Hesitant, patchy response but growing signs of activity 
 
Period 2: 1973-84, Forays and Stalemate 
First use of dawn raids, further cartels discovered, crisis cartels 
Commission style: still hesitant and some retrenchment  
 
Period 3: 1985-98, Seizing the Initiative 
Fines increasing, Leniency Programme 
Commission style: Leadership, comes of age, increasingly active 
                 
Period 4: 1999-present, Modernisation and Combat and the Decussis Mirabilis  
Reg1/2003, decentralisation, modernisation, revised Guidelines for Setting Fines, New 
Settlement  Procedure,  Green  and  White  Papers  on  Private  Actions,  Internal 
reorganisation 
Commission style: Pro-active and increasingly innovative 
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Surveying the Terrain, 1962-72  
   
DG Competition was established in 1960 but only acquired weapons to combat anti-
competitive practices in March 1962 once the Council had finally settled upon an 
agreed administrative ax ante (the German preference) model as laid down within 
Regulation 17/62. This regulation served as DG Competition’s procedural bible for 
over forty years. As a new entity Competition required time to acclimatise itself and 
its main concern and priority for most of the 1960s centred on forms of vertical 
integration/relationships rather than on horizontal (price-fixing and market sharing) 
agreements  (Sufrin  and  Jones,  2008).  This  situation  has  two  interconnected 
explanations.  On  the  one  hand  the  Commission  was  responding  to  notifications 
coming  before  it.  In  its  first  five  years  the  Commission  received  almost  40,000 
(Goyder, 2003) notifications which practically pushed it to breaking point and both 
shifted DG Competition’s attention and resources away from cartelbusting. The vast 
majority of these (some 25,000) were vertical agreements (European Commission, 
1980; 15). Many were structured around exclusive dealing arrangements and were 
usually managed through national trading associations and very much embedded in 
the national context (Harding and Joshua, 2003; 119). On the other hand and from 
the  Commission’s  perspective  such  vertical  based  agreements  seriously  affected 
trade  between  the  member  states,  created  barriers  to  trade  and  distorted  the 
realisation  of  a  genuine  common  market.  Thus,  DG  COMP  focused  much  of  its 
resources  on  vertical  restraints  in  the  distribution  and  licensing  schemes  as  in 
Grundig-Consten  ([1964]  CMLR  489  or  [1966]  ECR  299).  This  case  from 
September 1964 represented the very first infringement prosecution in the history of 
EC competition law and accurately displayed the problems of vertical agreements 
and how they damaged competition within the market.  
  The  case  centred  on  the  German  company  Grundig  and  its  trading 
relationship  with  its  French  distributor  Consten  where  the  latter  was  granted  the 
exclusive  right  to  sell  Grundig’s  products  in  France  (See  Goyder,  2003).  The 
Commission rejected the possibility of an exemption  whereupon its decision was 
appealed  unsuccessfully  from  Grundig’s  perspective  to  the  European  Court  of 
Justice. This example of a vertical arrangement represented a familiar, if undesirable, 
aspect  of business  activity and the Commission  took  action against  a  number of 
similar styled arrangements in the mid 1960s. By focusing on this type of agreement 
the Commission faced intense criticism (and especially from US observers) over its 
priorities and failing to tackle the main horizontal form of anti-competitive activity. 
Such  accusations  of  policy  failure/misdirection  compelled  the  Commission  to 
conceive ways of dealing with the more pressing and contentious issue of cartels   as 
opposed to the more `mundane’ vertical agreements. It was not until the end of the 
1960s that the Commission really started to focus on the anti-competitive dangers posed 
by horizontal cartels and took is first decisions in now infamous Quinine (OJ L191, 
5.6.69) and Aniline Dyes (OJ 195/11, 1969 ECR 619) cases. Cartelbusting had begun 
though albeit in a cautious fashion with some ECU 500 000 being levied in the Aniline 
Dye case in 1969.       
 
Forays and Stalemate 1973-84 
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The  1970s  began  positively  for  the  evolution  of  the  EU  as  negotiations  were 
successfully  concluded  on  its  first  enlargement  and  the  subsequent  arrival  of 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK as the newest Member States in January 1973. On the 
competition  front  the  Commission  published  its  first  annual  competition  policy 
report in 1972 in an effort to inject a degree of greater transparency and provide 
publicly available information on the cases settled in the previous calendar year. The 
very first report clearly laid down the objectives which sought to prioritise the `need 
to take action with special rigour against restrictions on competition and practices 
jeopardising the unity of the Common Market, notably sharing markets, allocating 
customers and collective exclusive dealing arrangements, and preventing agreement 
which indirectly resulted in concentrating demand on particular producers’ Although 
written by officials within DG Competition these reports provided useful information 
and once again demonstrated a growing self-assuredness in making policy decisions. 
It was going to need it as the competition principle came under attack.   
  Even as Denmark, Ireland and the UK acceded to the EU the warning sides of 
economic downturn were already in the air. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
in August 1971 brought to an end the financial order of the convertibility of the US 
dollar to gold and floating exchange rates and ushered in major changes to the financial 
landscape. The decision by OPEC in 1973 to raise the price of oil per barrel impacted 
directly on the economies of the Western world as costs soared, unemployment returned 
and inflation soared.
9 If the 1950s and the 1960s had been the time of higher economic 
growth and greater prosperity the 1970s were hit by recession, doubt and Eurosclerosis. 
In response Member State governments scrambled to protect their national industries 
and  thereby  maintain  employment.  They  did  not  do  this  in  any  co -ordinated  or 
cooperative  fashion  but  sought  refuge  and  protectionism  in  the  erection  and 
maintenance of a range of non tariff barriers that included state subsidies to industry, 
imposition  of  quotas,  incomes  policies  and  preferential  treatment  for  national 
companies. Where was competition policy situated in this transformed economy? Was 
competition the problem or the solution and how would DG Competition respond?    
  This second phase of cartel policy covers the period from 1973 to 1984 and 
was set against an unsuitable climate for any persistent offensive action. Overall the 
entire Commission did not respond very well to the economic downturn (Cini and 
McGowan, 2009). The Commission maintained its anti-cartel drive and prosecuted a 
number  of  important  cartels.  During  this  period  it  demonstrated  considerable 
flexibility and adjusted to meet the changed economic circumstances (Commission, 
1977;  9).  It  was  recognised  that  certain  industries  were  becoming  more 
uncompetitive in the face of cheaper competition from abroad such as shipbuilding 
while  others  faced  a  future  of  longer  term  decline  such  as  coal  and  steel.  DG 
Competition remained wedded to its objectives and emphasised the advantages of the 
competitive process, but it was the best time to pursue any dogmatic advancement of 
the competition principle in the face of both external and internal opposition. The 
former existed in the guise of the Member State governments whereas the internal 
found voice amongst other DGs, most notably those dealing with industrial policy 
and  regional  policy.  DG  Competition  was  one  voice  among  many  within  the 
Commission  and  the  Competition  Commissioner  faced  8  colleagues  within  the 
College of Commissioners when it came to taking decisions on competition matters. 
Consequently,  DG  Competition  advanced  more  slowly  than  many  of  its  officials 
would have liked.  
                     
9 OPEC is the best known international example of a cartel and if it were ever to hold a meeting on US 
soil, all its participants would be arrested for abuses of anti-trust law.     
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  For  these  reasons  DG  Competition  opted  to  maintain  a  less  interventionist 
stance until economic conditions were more favourably disposed towards competition. 
In adopting a more light handed approach (Wigger, 2008; 175) the Commission was 
willing to turn a blind eye to state aid, but also showed its readiness to assist industries 
in decline and consider measures to alleviate unnecessary rises in unemployment such 
as the support for structural crisis cartel. These emergency cartels where firms engage in 
reciprocal reductions in capacity and output were encouraged in the short term in the 
hope  that  they  would  spur  recovery  and  enhance  technological  development.  The 
Commission has been willing to sacrifice the competition principle to avoid the social 
costs that industry restructuring left to the market would cause’ (Motta, 2007; 14). This 
softer approach, although infrequent, was evident if the Commission’s support of, for 
example, the sulphuric acid cartel. Few agreements were actually terminated and only a 
few  of  the  Commission’s  decisions  were  appealed  to  the  ECJ  (Belgian Wallpaper, 
Belgian  Tobacco).  Such  crisis  cartels  were,  however,  very  much  envisaged  as 
temporary measures (European Commission, 1977 although in reality many of these 
cartels  lasted  until  the  mid  1980s  and  led  to  greater  competitiveness.  It  would  be 
incorrect to label this period of the 1970s and early 1980s as a form of retrenchment in 
the  case  of  competition  policy  because  DG  Competition  was  making  progress, 
uncovering cartels and even conducted its first `dawn raids’ during this period. The 
story of EU cartel policy encapsulated an image of incremental growth but as the 
Commission pushed forward so the determination of the `enemy’ intensified as they 
tried to cover their tracks.  
 
Seizing the Initiative and Advancing Forward, 1985-99 
 
The momentum within the EU integration project was effectively regained through the 
appointment of Jacques Delors as President of the European Commission in 1984 and 
specifically his ability to persuade the then ten Member State governments to endorse 
the  Commission’s  White  Paper  on  `Completing  the  Internal  Market’  (European 
Commission,  1985).  Concerns  about  global  competitiveness  and  the  growing  neo-
liberal turn in policy focus came to transform notions about the role of competition in 
the  market  and  the  application  and  enforcement  of  antitrust  rapidly  emerged  as  a 
necessary tool in the Commission’s strategy to realise the Single European Market. The 
timing from DG Competition’s perspective could not have been more fortuitous and 
coincided with the arrival of the ultra-liberal and highly competent Leon Brittan as 
competition Commissioner. Indeed, the changed economic circumstances enabled the 
Commission to defrost Hallstein’s ideas that had been put on ice for some twenty years 
earlier and to continue the process that the ordo-liberals had commenced (Gehler and 
von der Groeben, 2002, 53). External developments fused with internal ambitions and 
together began to transform DG Competition’s centrality within the Commission and 
boosted its reputation. However, the more the single market took shape, the more DG 
Competition  felt  itself  further  constrained  because  the  Council’s  agreement  on 
European merger control mechanism in 1989 (McGowan and Cini, 1999) and the 
growing focus on liberalisation was to shift some of its limited and much needed 
resources away from the issue of cartel-busting.  
  As  DG  Competition’s  fortunes  rose  in  the  late  1980s  it  gradually 
demonstrated  a  more  assertive  nature  and  placed  greater  priority  on  the  need  to 
finally  combat  cartels.  This  anti-cartel  agenda  has  fuelled  the  priorities  of  every 
Competition Commissioner from Leon Brittan to Neelie Kroes. Beyond the rhetoric 
the Commission’s determination was often thwarted by resistance or lack of interest  
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in some member states and its own limited powers for manoeuvre. The best weapon 
at its disposal under Regulation 17 was the power to impose fines on companies who 
had  deliberately  opted  to  breach  Article  81.  In  order  to  deter  cartelisation  the 
Commission first of all recognised the need to impose higher fines and a general 
upward  trajectory  can  be  identified  from  the  mid  1980s  onwards.  The  history of 
fining  cartel  infringements  reflects  growing  DG  Competition  confidence  and 
determination as has the subject of what an optimal fine is!. From the mid-1980s it is 
possible to detect an upward trend in the severity of fines being imposed (McGowan, 
2000). The Polypropylene (OJ 1986 L230/1) and PVC (OJ 1989 L74/1, 4 CMLR 345) 
cases in 1986 and 1989 respectively when both were levied fines of ECU 58 million 
and ECU 23.1 million respectively reflected a stronger Commission determination to 
tackle cartel activity.  
  The tougher fining policy brought consequences. One of the most immediate 
repercussions was a rise in the number of challenges against Commission decisions 
being  brought  by  the  businesses  concerned  before  the  European  courts.  The  EU 
competition regime had provided the Courts as a forum for appeal. The symbiotic 
relationship between the Commission and the European courts has long represented 
one of the most crucial dynamics behind individual EU cartel case outcomes. The 
Commission’s credibility has always tested by appeals to the Courts. A degree of 
relative  harmony  had  existed  almost  undisturbed  between  the  two  supranational 
institutions in the promotion of integration (from the earliest cases such as Aniline 
Dyes, European Sugar Cartel and Quinine cases) until the Court of First Instance 
emerged in 1989 with an altogether more independent and critical approach to the 
Commission’s degree of analysis and argument. Relations between the Commission 
and the Courts, however, grew fraught during the 1990s when the CFI overturned a 
number of Commission decisions on the grounds of a supposedly flawed analysis 
which often rested on the absence of clear proof and documentary evidence that 
cartels  were  actually  in  existence.  The  Woodpulp  (OJ  L85,  26/03/85)  case  fully 
illustrated the tensions and a long drawn out appeal process soured relations between 
both institutions. It remains the exception rather than the rule. 
  Cartels deliberately seek to conceal their anti-competitive activities and in 
order to do so have met outside the EU, opted to conceal and on occasions even not 
to  keep  records  about  the  structure  of  the  infringement.  It  was,  of  course,  not 
unreasonable for the courts to follow this course of action when they felt that some 
Commission  decisions  lacked  sufficient  evidence.  Nevertheless,  such 
pronouncements fuelled frustrations within DG Competition on the back of anger 
that the competition regulator had always been understaffed. This was a serious, but 
a fairly accurate assessment of its resources and the personnel shortage effectively 
restricted its anti-cartel drive. Fines were a means to deter cartels, but their impact as 
a deterrent has always remained highly dubious and propelled the Commission to 
consider  complementary  measures  and  to  design  new  strategies  to  combat 
cartelisation.  
  The  adoption  of  the  EU’s  first  Leniency  Notice  in  1996  (OJ  C207, 
18/07/1996) marks the onset of a more proactive Commission response. Although 
novel as far as European competition experience is concerned the leniency initiative 
reflected  practice  that  had  been  established  by  the  Antitrust  division  of  the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States in 1979.
10 Both programmes were 
                     
10 The DOJ granted immunity from its criminal sanctions regime. The scheme was thoroughly 
revised in 1993 and has led to a growing number of firms applying for leniency and providing 
evidence that have enabled the US competition authorities to unearthed cartels    
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specifically designed to destabilise cartels which is predicated on inducements and 
sweeteners in the form of substantially reduced fines and even total immunity from 
fines if cartel members break cover and inform on their colleagues. This initiative 
recognised and sought to benefit from the unstable nature of many cartels (and few last 
more than five years) and sought to exploit it. Complete immunity under the leniency 
programme was available for the first informant who provided sufficient information 
for  the  Commission  to  launch  an  inspection  of  premises  and  so  long  as  they 
continued  to  co-operate  throughout  the  investigation.  The  Commission  wielded 
considerable discretion throughout and any applications for immunity which were 
deemed not to have provided sufficient information could be denied. Leniency was a 
useful innovation in theory, but would it work in practice? As a tool it was a means 
of deterring cartels but few saw it as a means of preventing cartelisation in the first 
place  and  the  Commission  was  effectively  compelled  to  consider  a  series  of 
complementary measures to enhance both its abilities to focus on more cartels and 
simultaneously to further dissuade the emergence of such practices. The scene was 
set for a new heightened period of anti-cartel activity.    
 
Imagination and Design: Launching the Latest Offensives, 1999 – present   
 
In  the  course  of  the  last  decade  the  Commission’s  has  enhanced  its  anti-cartel 
strategy  by  introducing  refinements  and  making  adjustments  to  the  Leniency 
programme (in 2002 and 2006), bringing in a stricter fining policy (in 2006) and the 
publishing  its  Green  (European  Commission,  2005)  and  White  Papers  (European 
Commission, 2008) on Private Actions as well as processing more decisions (see 
figure 1). These innovative administrative alterations were fairly easy to introduce as 
they did not neither require the approval of either the Council or the support of the 
European Parliament. Undoubtedly, the most significant development  in this four 
phase  of  activity  centres  on  the  overhaul  of  the  operational  procedures  and 
mechanics  of  EU  cartel  policy  that  were  enshrined  in  Regulation  1/2003  (and 
replaced  Regulation  17)  and  came  into  operation  on  1.  May  2004.  The  new 
regulation  facilitates  the  Commission’s  determination  to  modernise,  simplify  and 
improve  the  administrative  machinery.  It  formed  the  culmination  of  the 
Commission’s plans that were outlined formally in its 1999 White Paper (European 
Commission, 1999), to fully modernise cartel policy. 
  The reform agenda (to replace Regulation 17) had been driven by two factors: 
firstly, recognition that the existing practices that had been in place for over forty years 
were becoming ever more problematic and secondly, an expected augmented case load 
after EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. In short, the reworking was 
designed  to  facilitate  the  Commission’s  cartel-busting  enforcement  strategies;  to 
create a more level playing field and  ensure a greater degree of consistency and 
certainty for companies and to reduce the bureaucratic processes. Modernisation and 
decentralisation were the hallmarks of this reform package and both were presented 
by the Commission as a means to secure better enforcement through redesigning the 
rules  that  applied  to  the  handling  of  Article  81  and  through  the  creation  of  a 
European family of competition regulators that brought together the Commission and 
the national authorities within the European Competition Network (ECN).   
 
Cartel Cases decided by the European Commission since 1990 
 
PERIOD  NUMBER  
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1990-1994  11 
1995-1999  10 
2000-2004  33 
2005-2008  24 
TOTAL  78 
 
 
Source: European Commission website 
 
The  former  (i.e.  pre-2004)  system  had  placed  responsibility  for  enforcing  the 
competition rules on the Commission. This may have made sense, but the requirement 
that  all  agreements  that  potentially  violated  article  81  had  to  be  notified  to  the 
Commission and especially if an exemption was sought, proved largely unsatisfactory 
and practically unworkable from an efficiency perspective. It had effectively pushed 
DG Competition from the start into a largely reactive mode, and one that had diverted 
the competition directorate’s staff away from cartel busting towards often routine but 
numerous  notifications  from  companies  who  wished  to  ensure  that  their  specific 
agreements  did  not  contravene  the  provisions  of  Article  81.  In  effect,  DG 
Competition  had  found  itself  swamped  from  the  very  outset  under  a  sea  of 
notifications.  The  creation  of  block  exemptions  for  certain  sectors,  de  minimis 
thresholds (that have been regularly revised) and the issuing of comfort letters (as an 
interim measure that allowed companies to operate safe in the knowledge that they 
would be exempted from any future negative Commission decision) certainly played 
a considerable role in easing the caseload but it did not eradicate the problem entirely 
and the Commission was never able to digest its workload. Dealing with notifications 
meant that there was less time to pursue its own proactive investigations. Indeed, EU 
enlargement  to  27  may  not  have  meant  paralysis  but  it  certainly  threatened  to 
severely  undermine  the  workings  of  the  EU  competition  regime.  In  short,  the 
centralised  system  established  by  Regulation  17  hampered  `the  application  of 
Community rules by the courts and competition authorities of the member states, and 
the system ...prevents the Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the 
most serious infringements.
11 
  Regulation  1/2003  makes  significant  strides  in  the  evolution  of  DG 
Competition’s cartel wars. In the first instance the system of notifications has been 
abolished  and  now  follows  the  American  ex  post  model.  Firms  are  now  fully 
expected to know the rules of the game and what practices are permissible and which 
are not allowed. This alteration enables DG Competition’s staff to allocate much 
more of their time tackling real anti-competitive practices. One of the most creative 
features  of  the  new  regulation  envisaged  the  decentralisation  of  enforcement  by 
allowing the national competition authorities and courts to be able directly to apply 
articles 81 (and 82) to any agreement that affected intra-state trade. In all areas were 
there existed a `cross-national effect that EC law will apply. This affirmation of  a 
system of parallel competences and the creation of a flexible mechanism for case 
allocation between the national and supranational levels) is a radical innovation. Put 
another way the regulation effectively means that the status and authority of the national 
competition bodies have been transformed into cartel-like agencies of the European 
Commission.  
                     
 
11 See point 3, See point 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the Implementation of the 
Rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty  
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  Some have interpreted this reform package as an adept masterstroke on the 
part of the Commission to anchor its pre-eminent position (Wilks, 2005) vis á vis the 
national  authorities  while  others  have  been  more  critical  and  argue  that  the 
alterations  threaten  a  complete  Balkanisation  of  competition  policy  enforcement 
(Joshua, 2001). It is still too early to provide an accurate assessment of the reform 
but the Commission is already conducting a survey of Regulation 1/2003 in practice 
which remained  open for public comment  until the end of September 2008. The 
results are awaited with interest. 
  Reform, it must be emphasised was far from being automatic or a foregone 
conclusion. Discussions and deliberations within the Council had revealed a number 
of detractors, and particularly in Germany, where repeated concerns were raised by 
the German Federal Cartel Office (BKartA) about what it deemed to constitute the 
inherent weaknesses of the new regime. These have centred primarily on the degree 
to which EU decisions were subject to the infusion of politicking in the College of 
Commissioners. Although the BKartA vocally resisted changes and tried to ensure 
that Article 81 should serve as a minimum standard with national competition law 
being  allowed  to  offer  stricter  formulations  it  was  unable  to  muster  a  blocking 
minority  in  Council  and  the  proposals  passed.  Identifying  this  major  reform  as 
modernisation,  although  certainly  undeniable,  provides,  however,  only  a  partial 
explanation. The other avenue for exploration must focus on what represents the 
Europeanization  (read  policy  convergence)  of  cartel  policy.  For  others,  the  final 
version of Regulation created the `French’ administrative model of cartel policy! 
  Cartelbusting  has  never  been  quite  as  straightforward  as  the  handling  of 
potential  mergers.  Over  the  years  firms  engaged  in  such  practices  have  become 
increasingly adept at concealing their moves. For example, experience has shown 
that there are numerous cases where business records have been stored at the home 
of directors or other employees and to aid the cartelbusters the new regulation grants 
the European Commission the power for the first time to interview individuals or 
representatives from an undertaking (Article 19), enables the Commission not only to 
search business premises where serious violations are suspected (Article 20), but also 
under Article 21 equips the cartel busters with the power to search domestic premises 
(home raids).
12 Complaints from third parties and former cartel members represent a 
fundamental  means  of   detecting  infringements  and  from  the  Commission’s 
perspective  it  remains  essential  to  establish  a  clear  and  efficient  procedure  for 
handling complain procedures. Moreover, the Commission has been given the ability 
to conduct its own enquiry into a particular sector of the economy is again reinforced 
and in both theory and practice from now on should be much easier to conduct than 
in the past when the Commission was overloaded with notifications. This step is 
already  producing  positive  results  and  enabled,  for  example,  the  Commission  to 
launch a full enquiry and information gathering exercise into the state of competition 
in the pharmaceutical sector for those medicines related to human consumption in 
January 2008 (IP/08/49).  
   EU cartel policy moved centre stage after 2004 and attention is focusing 
more  than  ever  on  the  identification,  targeting  and  pursuit  of  cartels.  Kroes  has 
pledged to `be steadfast in applying zero tolerance to those who operate cartels to the 
disadvantage of customers…I have made it crystal clear that the fight against cartels 
will be one of my top priorities… I intend to walk the walk as well as talk the talk’ 
                     
12 See point 26, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
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(Kroes, 2006b). There is, of course, nothing particularly new in rhetoric behind this 
anti-cartel drive. The rhetoric is good, but is the Commission delivering? 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-CARTEL STATEGY  
 
DG Competition is certainly trying to deliver in terms of policy and organisational 
changes. Throughout the history of EU restrictive practices and cartel policy it is 
clear that DG Competition’s activities have been hampered by too many potential 
cases coming before it  and insufficient staff numbers to deal adequately (in terms of 
speedy  decision  making)  with  all  these  cases.  DG  Competition  and  external 
commentators had long voiced their concern (and correctly) over insufficient staffing 
levels  and  a  backlog  arose  which  restricted  DG  Competition’s  pursuit  of  cartel 
agreements. Aware of this reality and the prevalence of cartels the Commission has 
long  sought  a  means  to  prioritise  its  fight  against  such  overt  anti-competitive 
practices. This objective has been brought closer with an increase in staff levels. A 
number of recent rises in overall personnel numbers to some 750 by the end of 2006 
(as compared to 411 in 1992) (Cini and McGowan, 2009:53) is expected to allow the 
competition regulator to handle more cases. An augmented pool of staff may work 
but DG Competition will still be hard pressed, however, as overall numbers are still 
fairly  modest.  Indeed,  some  357  officials  deal  with  anti-trust,  mergers  and 
liberalisation as well as cartels. The welcome additional staff numbers have enabled 
a degree of strategic organisational restructuring and the creation of a new dedicated 
(and 60 strong) Cartels Directorate. It is a welcome development but in reality more 
staff is required. The number of decisions in cartel cases is somewhat low (as figures 
1  and  2  illustrate)  and  is  due  to  resource  constraints  and  arguably  a  degree  of 
inefficiency within DG Competition where there is considerable staff rotation and the 
involvement of too many staff with pending cases and cases before the Courts. The 
decision making process remains too slow. Even without taking on any new cases it 
is generally assumed that DG Competition would require several years to clear the 
existing  backlog.  Not  surprisingly  the  Commission  has  continued  to  seek  further 
deterrents and means to both break-up cartels and to deter them in the first place.   
 
 
Figure 2 
Commission Cartel decisions and annual fines since 2003 
 
Year  No. of Cartels detected  Total Fines 
2003  5  404.8 m 
2004  6  390.2 m 
2005  5  683 m 
2006  7  1,846 m 
2007  8  3,338 m 
2008   7  2,271 
2009 (to March)  1
13   132 
Total  39  9, 065 m 
 
                     
13 Marine Hoses became the first cartel decision of 2009 (IP/09/137) when 6 companies were handed a 
finer of €131 million.  
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Source: DG Competition website http://ec.europa.eu/competitionand sourced on 11. March 
2009 
 
Source: European Commission  
 
One of the most visible developments over the last decade has the Commission’s 
determination to move towards harsher penalties and the imposition of meaningful 
fines. The seventeen highest fines in the history of EU cartel policy were all levied 
after 2000 and nine of these have occurred after 2005 (see figure 3). The Car Glass
14 
and the Lifts and Escalators cartels embody the two largest fines to date in the history 
of EU cartelbusting. These fines may illustrate an upward trajectory but there have 
always been questions over whether such administrative fines impact sufficiently on 
the companies to hurt them or deter them from further activity  (see figure 4)? How 
high is high enough has been an issue that has divided commentators ?
15 There is 
general agreement that deterrence requires a heavy financial sanction but the  fines 
imposed by the Commission may simply fail to outweigh the illegal profits that have 
been earned. For many commentators (Buiccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006, Motta, 2007) 
fines have traditionally been  set at  too low a level and have argued that  any real 
deterrent needs to greatly exceed the original 10 per cent threshold established under 
Regulation 17. Few fines have come anywhere close!
16  
 
 
   
 
 
 
                     
14 The Commission’s decision to levy fines of over €1.383 896 000 on the members of the Car Glass 
cartel (IP/08/1685) marks yet another milestone in the history of EU cartelbusting for two reasons. 
This fine, which was based on the 2006 guidelines (IP/06/857), represents the highest ever levy for an 
infringement  of  Article  81  and  secondly,  represents  the  highest  ever  fine  against  an  individual 
company  (Saint  Gobain)  in  its  role  as  a  repeat  offender  (see  figure  7.5). The  cartel had  been  in 
operation from 1998 to 2003 and had actively sought to restrict competition by fixing process and 
allocating markets. Car glass itself is used in a variety of ways by the car industry in the manufacture 
of windscreens, wing mirrors, windows and sun-rooves. The cartel bore the familiar characteristics. 
Meetings had been arranged to take place in airports and hotels in different European cities where 
confidential information was exchanged by the parties concerned. Neelie Kroes was scathing in her 
comments about the objectives of this cartel and argued that these companies had cheated the car 
industry and car buyers for five years in a market which was estimated to be worth two billion euros 
in the last year of the cartel. Given the size of the market and its affects the Commission regarded this 
cartel as a `very serious infringement’ of the antitrust rules and was extremely critical of the activities 
of the cartel members who comprised Asahi, Pilkington, Saint-Gobain and Soliver. Together the four 
offenders  controlled  more  than  90  per  cent  of  the  EU  market  (including  the  EEA)  for  branded 
replacement glass for car. The case was also interesting in its own right as an `own initiative’ case to 
which DG Competition had been alerted to by an unknown third part and suggests that the recent 
reforms  are  bearing  fruit.    Asahi  was  granted  a  50  per  cent  reduction  in  its  fine  as  it  supplied 
information under the Leniency Notice. 
15 See OECD, Report on Hard Core Cartels, 2002.  
16 In Elevators and Escalators ThyssenKrupp’s consolidated sales, according to its annual report, 
amounted to roughly €47,100 million for 2005/2006. It had increased its total turnover by €4,198 
million. The fines imposed by the Commission was €480 million and represented less than 10 per cent 
of the previous year’s turnover.   
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The EU’s Cartel Wars: The Seventeen Largest Fines in EU Antitrust History, 1969-
present
17 
 
Case Name and 
Economic Sector  
Year fine imposed  Number of Cartel 
Members  
Amount of Fine 
(euro)  
Car Glass  2008  4  1,383.8 million 
Lift and Escalators i  2007  5  992.3 million 
Vitamins   2001  4  855 million (on 
appeal reduced to 
790.5 million) 
Gas Insulated 
Switchgear i 
2007   11  750.7 million 
Candle Waxes i  2008  10  676.0 million 
Synthetic Rubber i  2006  6  519 million 
Flat Glass i   2007  4  486.9 million 
Plasterboard i   2002  -  458.5 million 
Hydrogen peroxide i   2006  9  388.1 million 
Methacrylates (Acrylic 
Glass) 
2006  5  344.5 million 
Hard Haperdashery/Zip 
Fasteners i  
2007  7  328.6 million 
Copper Fittings 
Producers i  
2006  11  314.7 million 
Carbonless Paper  2001  6  313.6 million 
Plastic Industrial Bags i  2005  16  290.7 million 
Dutch Brewers ‘  2007  4  273.7 million 
Bitumen Netherlands i  2006  14  266.6 million 
Chloroprene Rubber i   2007  6  247.6 million 
 
i)  appeal lodged before the CFI 
 
ii)  Following judgment of the CFI  
Source: European Commission website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/faqs_en.html on 12. March 2009 
 
 
The Commission recognised such criticisms and finally introduced a new, and the 
strictest  yet,  framework  notice  for  the  setting  of  fines  in  2006  and  one  that 
significantly raises the bar when imposing fines (IP/06/857, OJ C 210). It sees a 
possible 10 fold increase in the level of fine that can be imposed and an even higher 
penalty for repeat offenders.
18 The Commission is making its intention robustly clear 
                     
17 There were of course a number of smaller cases during this period. It is not the intention to list all 
here but they  included amongst others, decisions against: FETTCSA (€6.9 million in 2000); Amino 
Acids (€109 million in 2000); Soda-Ash (€33 million in 2000); SAS/Maersk Air (€52.5 million in 
2001);  Sodium  Gluconate  (€57.7  million  in  2001);  Belgian  Brewers  (€91  million  in  2001); 
Luxembourg Brewers (€448,000 in 2001); Citric  Acid (€135.22 million in 2001); German Banks 
(€100.8 million in 2001); Austrian Banks (€124.46 million in 2002); Dutch Industrial Gases €25 
million in 2002); Sothebys/Christies (€20.4 million in 2002); Food Favour Enhancers (€20.56 milion 
in 2002) and Concrete Reinforcing Bars (€85 million in 2002).  
18 The actual level of fine is calculated to reflect both the length and seriousness of a particular 
infringement and also to punish those habitual offenders. New draft guidelines were published in June  
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and by stiffening the deterrent is hoping to encourage more whistleblowers. The new 
fining arrangements mark a major step forward and it is increasingly difficult to 
make a case for higher fines without seriously entailing some degree of social costs 
for the companies concerned. Fining arrangements may represent a useful means to 
deter existing cartels but how far do they prevent the formation of new cartels? Under 
existing arrangements managers and chief executives rarely lose their jobs for cartel 
activity. The move towards the introduction of criminal sanctions (as in the USA and 
in some EU member states) which includes real and personal risk (prison sentences) 
to  such  executives  may  arguably  provide  greater  results.  The  issue  of  criminal 
sanctions would certainly prove controversial in terms of wider discussions about EU 
competences under the current Pillar 1, but such sanctions already apply in many 
member states (though they are rarely used). Creeping steps towards some form of 
`harmonised criminal sanctions’ (Daly, 2007:315) for cartel offences in the EU are 
probably  much  closer  than  many  commentators  realise  though  there  is  scope  to 
debate the origins and promoters of such developments.   
  For the moment, pecuniary sanctions remain the Commission’s best weapon 
and they impact in another way as evidence illustrates that markets do react rather 
badly to Commission investigations of cartel activity (as made public in dawn raids), 
infringement decisions and negative court judgements (Langer and Motta, 2006). In 
the short term a firm’s value actually falls. How far and how damaging such falls 
may  be  is  open  to  further  question.  Positively,  however,  the  fines  impact  on 
European consumers in two ways. The first outcome is relatively straightforward and 
relates to the benefits to consumers from a system of genuine competition (better 
quality products at lower prices) but the second is equally significant and relates 
directly to this attempt to mainstream competition policy because these fines are paid 
directly to the EU and enter the miscellaneous category of the EU budget.   
  This  fourth  period  of  activity  also  saw  an  overhauling  of  the  Leniency 
initiative  in  2002  (OJ  C45,  19/02/02).  Leniency  had  promised  to  relieve  DG 
Competition’s resources and to provide hard evidence to present to the courts, but it 
had not proved as successful as imagined. There was one major distinction between 
the EU and the US leniency schemes. Whereas leniency was automatic under the US 
regime it was at the Commission’s discretion to give and by how much under the EU 
system. In its scheme the Commission had devised several categories to reflect the level 
of reduction in the fine depending on the material and evidence supplied by the firm in 
question. This proved problematic as it left business unsure about the advantages of 
pursuing the leniency route and prompted major reform in 2002 to provide immediate 
immunity. 
  Whereas  experience  of  the  first  Leniency  programme  had  displayed 
considerable reluctance towards this Commission initiative (Reynolds and Anderson, 
2006) the policy is now proving very effective and most cartels that are now being 
discovered  and  unravelled  by  the  Commission  following  the  receipt  of  insider 
evidence. Indeed, whereas the Commission received 80 applications (both for total 
immunity and a reduction in fines) in the period from 1996 to 2002 it is interesting to 
note post the 2002 Notice the rise in such requests. In the period from February 2002 
                                                            
2006 (to update the 1998 Notice) and approved in the autumn of 2006 and present a revised and 
tougher framework for the setting of fines. Under the new rules companies will be fined a so-called 
`entry fee’ automatically and this will amount to somewhere in the region of 15-25% of their specific 
annual turnover from the infringement in question while repeat offenders can expect even tougher  
example of how fines are set. 
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until the end of December 2006 104 applications were made. 56 of these were granted 
partial or complete immunity. The reworked 2002 Leniency Programme has `been an 
extremely effective device in uncovering cartels and in facilitating the Commission’s 
task to prosecute the companies involved in such cartels’ (Motta, 2007:18). The fact 
that more and more companies are approaching the Commission for leniency is a 
sure sign of the programme’s impact (see Geradin and Henry, 2005) and success and 
has been enthusiastically welcomed by the Commission. However, two points should 
be made. Firstly, the Leniency Programme has not really reduced the length of time 
needed  by  DG  Competition  to  handle  the  case  and  secondly,  the  competition 
regulator can still not deal with all cases brought before it on account of limited 
resources and prefers to focus on major international cartels. 
  The publication of the most recent Leniency Notice in December 2006 (OJ C 
298, 8/12/2008; de Broca, 2006) has reinforced the fundamental shift in business’ 
approaches to, and growing acceptance of the leniency initiative. This revised Notice 
represents a significant step to both detect and terminate hard core cartel activity. 
Hard core infringements (that divide markets, fix prices and/or apply conditions of 
sale) are deemed under Article 81 to constitute infringements even where in theory 
they  might  be  able,  but  in  practice  cannot  make  a  case  for  efficiency  benefits. 
Interestingly, in agreements where there are no specific hardcore clauses can still fall 
foul of the EU rules if they have the effect of restricting actual competition.   
  The  2006  Notice  clarifies  for  companies  the  information  the  Commission 
requires for an undertaking to benefit from immunity as well as providing greater 
guidance on how to obtain a reduction in fines. According to the Commission the 
leniency programme continues to play a crucial role in DG Competition’s detection 
efforts and continues to entice more `whistle blowers’ to come forward. However, it 
has  been  suggested  that  most  of  the  cartels  detected  through  the  leniency 
programmes would probably have broken up within a couple of years in any case 
(Lowe, 2007). Such often economic assessments should not be allowed to detract 
from serious nature of cartels. The fortunes for the companies who have opted to co-
operate have been mixed. In the very first decision stemming from the 2002 Notice 
in Raw Tobacco Italy the original whistleblower’s hope of conditional immunity was 
dashed  when  it  was  discovered  that  it  (Deltafina)  had  actually  pre-alerted  its 
competitors/cartel members of the pending Commission investigation. Nevertheless, 
Deltafina was deemed to have provided sufficient information and warranted a 50 
per cent reduction. 
  In Bitumen (2006) British Petroleum came forward as a whistle blower and 
was granted immunity from a Commission fine for clear cartel activity among oil 
producers. In this case the highest individual fine fell on Shell (€80 million) and 
provided further evidence of the Commission’s determination to punish such habitual 
cartel offenders (given Shell’s earlier involvement in the  PVS and Polypropelene 
cases) more severely.  In Chloroprene Rubber (IP-07/1855) Bayer’s decision to play 
whistle blower and inform  the Commission of a price fixing and market  rigging 
cartel  in  the  production  of  rubber  ensured  that  the  company  received  complete 
immunity from the overall fine while its former partners (including ENI and Tosoh) 
were punished for cartel activity that has lasted from 1993-2002.  
  As already pointed out (Motta, 2008; 211) the Leniency initiative has not 
reduced the overall length of investigation time. Most cases still take some three 
years  on  average  and  pushed  the  Commission  to  consider  the  adoption  of  a 
settlement  procedures  scheme  which  encapsulated  a  form  of  plea  bargaining  as 
already  exists  in  the  United  States.  The  settlement  procedure  for  cartels  was  
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introduced in June 2008 (IP/08/1056) and enables the Commission to settle cartel 
cases  through  a  more  simplified  procedure.  Basically  this  scheme  operates  when 
firms who have been alerted to the DG Competition’s file and evidence, agree to 
plead guilty to their (the company’s) participation in the specific infringement of 
Article 81. In return the Commission can reduce the fine that it would have imposed 
by some 10 per cent. The attraction of this course of action is a speedier response and 
a freeing up of resources and makes it more unlikely that the company will appeal to 
the Courts. This process should save time and manpower. The process is entirely 
voluntary and where no settlement is reached the usual procedure will apply. 
  In the meantime another Commission initiative centres on the introduction of 
a direct actions scheme whereby both companies and consumers could seek private 
damages  from  cartel  activity.  According  to  Kroes,  `businesses  and  consumers  in 
Europe lose billions of euros each and every year as a result of companies breaking 
EU antitrust rules. These people have a right to compensation through an effective 
system that complements public enforcement, whilst avoiding excessive burdens and 
abuses’.
19 Direct actions have been rare in EU competition law and in many of the 
member state jurisdictions but  they hold considerable potential for the competition 
regulator. The Commission’s Green Paper and a Staff Working Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust rules was published in December 2005. Its 
purpose (see Pheasant, 2006) was to launch a debate from stakeholders and to set out 
a number of possible options to facilitate private damages actions where loss has 
been suffered as a result of a deliberate infringement of the competition rules.
 20 The 
responses from the public discussion fed directly into the Commission’s White Paper 
on Damages in April 2008 which was once up again up for discussion until mid July 
2008. If civil actions come into play in cartel-busting it will provide another potential 
deterrent because if successful, any private claim for damages would come on top of 
the  fines  already  imposed  by  the  Commission.  Some  commentators  are  more 
sceptical and believe the impact will be les than imagined as few individuals will 
have the means to bring cases (see Walsh, 2008). The practice itself, however, marks 
a new shift in direction and one that again derives largely from US experiences and 
private litigation. The beauty of this approach from the Commission’s perspective is 
the act that it is completely resource free and is being strongly encouraged. In short, 
the  White  Paper  embodies  an  ingenious  move  and,  if  approved  by  the  Council, 
potentially represents another landmark in development of EC competition policy.  
    
AN ANTI-TRUST ENFORCEMENT COALITION 
 
The decentralisation of antitrust enforcement and the involvement of the national 
competition authorities in decision making proved relatively unproblematic as all the 
EU states had either voluntarily aligned their national policy with Article 81 (as in 
the EU15) or had done so as part of the conditionality arrangements for the states that 
                     
19 See the Commission’s competition web site at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html which was accessed on 11. 
August 2008. 
20 The public consultation on this Green  Article was open until 21st April 2006. The Commission 
received substantial comments from business and law firms across Europe and beyond and has put all 
submissions  on  its  website  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_contributions.html   
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acceded to the EU after April 2004. The convergence process reflected the reality 
that  much  cartel  activity  was  increasingly  cross-border  and  thus,  propelled  inter-
agency  dialogue.  The  convergence  process  with  the  European  Union  model  and 
particularly  from  both  those  states  with  the  most  experience  with  anti-cartel 
legislation  that  dates  back  to  the  late  1940s  (in  the  UK  case)  and  1957  (in  the 
German  context)  typifies  the  pull  of  the  integration  logic  and  notions  of 
Europeanization.  The decentralisation  process  had enabled the  construction  of an 
anti-cartel coalition that was centred on the European Competition Network (ECN) . 
  The ECN promises an ever closer relationship between the Commission and 
the  national  competition  authorities.  The  ECN    centres  on  which  provides  for  a 
greater degree of both horizontal and vertical exchanges of information, consultation 
and interaction between all the members over policy in general and specifically over 
individual competition cases and has led to a number of joint statements. It can be read 
as an ingenious mechanism to foster and develop a competition culture across EU 
space  and  supersedes  earlier  forms  of  interaction  which  Gerber  (Gerber,  2002) 
labelled both the `foundational model’ and the `solar model’.  In operation it is hoped 
that the ECN will potentially strengthen information symmetry and reduce conflict. It 
will certainly strengthen the `federal’ relationship.  
  Developments  in  European  cartel  governance  in  both  the  form  of  policy 
convergence and the new `European family of competition authorities’ (Lehmkuhl, 
2008: 151) have been truly remarkable.  Given that some states in Western Europe 
did not even possess a competition law in 1990 let alone the non-existence of the 
competition principle in the newest EU Member States that had once belonged to the 
Soviet block, the emergence of competition governance is somewhat revolutionary. 
We should neither readily dismiss the different philosophies, approaches and national 
provisions  that  had  existed  and  shaped  cartel  policy  even  in  the  states  with 
competition laws in Western Europe nor the lack of contact between the EU rules 
and the national systems (Riley, 2003). Can these different experiences prevent the 
arrival of a single European cartel policy?  
  According to the Commission, however, the ECN is already proving effective 
as  a forum  for consultation and information  exchange.  So  far, disputes have not 
occurred. Indeed, one of the first positive outcomes of such dialogue centres on the 
readiness of national competition authorities to alert the Commission and other ECN 
members about potential cartel infringements and thereafter to embark on joint co-
operation  in  the  very  early  stages  of  the  investigations.  Others  (Riley,  2003  and 
Wilks, 2007) remain to be fully convinced and hold that the ultimate success of the 
ECN will depend on the powers of enforcement and the reality that some of the 
national authorities (e.g. the British, French and German) are unquestionably more 
significant players within the ECN in terms of budget and case-load than many of the 
others.  
  Others  have  wondered  whether  the  EU  modernisation  plan  was  `deeply 
flawed’  (Joshua, 2001). Federalising competition policy with  a system  of federal 
courts  was  a  radical  idea  but  doubts  were  raised  about  the  challenge  that  the 
fragmentation  of  enforcement  poses  for  legal  predictability  and  consistency  in  a 
multi-level governance system like the EU and especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe. It is one thing to enact competition legislation and another to implement it. 
In order to prevent any inconsistency in approach the Commission has  moved to 
finance training programmes to the value of €600,000 to train and retrain national 
judges about the latest developments in competition law. Considerable co-operation  
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within the EU seems to be becoming a reality but time will tell how secure and 
pronounced this actually is.  
  Since the late 1990s fewer Commission decisions have been overturned by 
the Courts as the Commission started to receive much more substantive evidence and 
proof  through  the  Leniency  programme.  However,  although  the  Courts  have  not 
rejected any of the more recent Commission decisions they have usually opted to 
slightly lower many of the actual Commission fines (Motta, 2008). Recourse to the 
courts makes sense for firms who hope at least for a reduction in the size of the 
overall fines. Between 1999 and 2006 fines were appealed in 33 out of 39 instances. 
Some 13 were reduced. In order for cartel policy to be effective there needs to be a 
general consensus on the part of both the Commission and the Courts over facts and 
stances.  Constant  friction  and  disagreements  would  seriously  undermine  policy 
effectiveness. Both have come to realised this. In 2005, for example, the European 
courts reviewed eight cartel decisions (some four in 2004) and significantly, backed 
the Commission’s stance in each case. The Commission has also taken to welcoming 
Court judgements as in CFI’s ruling on Plasterboard when Commission’s initial fines 
were  reduced  from  €478  million  to  €458  million/  (MEMO/08/489  Date:  
08/07/2008). Advances are being made in the Commission’s war against cartels but 
let’s be clear. Even with the recent increases in staffing levels it is clear that DG 
Competition is still under-resourced and this is particularly true for the fight against 
cartels. This explains why the Commission continually seeks new mechanisms and 
means to aid its activities.     
  .   
Figure 7.5 
The Ten largest Fines imposed by the Commission on Individual Companies for Cartel 
Membership 
 
 
Company  Fine (euros)  Year 
Saint Gobain  896000 000  2008 (Car Glass) 
ThyssenKrupp  479 669 850   2007 (Lifts and Escalators)  
Hoffmann-La Roche  462 000 000  2001 (Vitamins) 
Siemens  396 562 500  2007 (Gas Insulated Gear)  
Pilkington  370 000 000  2008 (Car Glass) 
Sasol Limited   318 200 000  2008 (Candle Wax) 
ENI SpA  272 250 000  2006 Synthetic Rubber  
Lafarge SA  249 600 000  2002 (Plasterboard) 
BASF AG  236 845 000  2001 (Vitamins) 
Otis  224 932 950  2007 (Lifts and Escalators) 
 
Source:  European  Commission  website  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/faqs_en.html on 12. March 2009 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
   
EU cartel policy provides for a fascinating study of supranational enforcement activity 
and one where once the Commission had accrued its powers, developed its arguments 
and bolstered its position as a puissant and determined regulator. The Commission 
consistently  displayed  both  imagination  and  drive  in  its  efforts  to  combat  cartels  
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through initiatives such as the decentralisation of its remit, the leniency notices, the 
imposition of higher fines, moves towards direct actions and is firmly located as the 
focal  point  of  anti-trust  activity  within  the  ECN.  Having  been  empowered  by  the 
Member States the Commission has been able to graft on new notices and guidelines 
itself to make cartel policy more efficient. Building in mechanisms (such as the ECN) 
as  a  means  of  securing  greater  co-operation  and  consistency  with  the  national 
competition authorities is one such route that hopes to enhance detection and foster a 
common competition culture. Time will tell how effective this will be but it appears for 
some to be working well already (ABA, 2005).  
  Judging  just  how  successful  European  cartel  policy  actually  is  remains  an 
arduous task for we only get to learn about the cartels that have been unearthed. Just 
how many unknown agreements proliferate through the entire global economy? Are 
the cartel authorities really making an impact on attitudes? Officials are prepared to 
state  that  they  are  probably  discovering  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  and  that  the 
challenge confronting all cartel-busting regulators is immense. According to Phillip 
Lowe (Lowe 2007), DG Competition’s Director General the Commission will only 
uncover  about  10  per  cent  of  cartel  activity.  This  demonstrates  the  difficulty  in 
diminishing the propensity that exists among many businesses towards cartelisation 
and  the  negative  aspects  that  arise  from  this  activity.  Ultimately,  cartels  as  an 
element  of  the  business  world  in  all  probability  will  never  be  vanquished.  The 
regulator’s task is an immense one and each must create the best possible conditions 
that  deter  cartelisation.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  the  Commission  is  making  progress. 
Detection is getting easier but finding the right deterrent remains somewhat elusive.  
  From a positive perspective DG Competition has correctly opted to prioritise 
its  cartel-busting  activities  and  its  record  over  the  last  twenty  years  is  pretty 
impressive.  Horizontal  price  fixing  and  market  sharing  agreements  have  been 
attacked robustly. An analysis of the Commission’s cartel decisions (see its website 
for official figures) reveals how the number of cartel agreements being uncovered 
has risen steadily since the late 1980s. This has corresponded with a dramatic rise in 
the level of fines that have been imposed by the Commission on cartels since the mid 
1990s.  The  publication  of  the  fining  notices  (1998  and  2006)  and  the  Leniency 
Programme  seem  to  have  made  a  positive  impact  as  far  as  dissolving  cartels  is 
concerned. There are still issues and problems to be addressed.    
  In  this  the  under-resourced  Commission  has  shown  degrees  of  flair  and 
imagination in the recent past. As DG Competition’s resolve intensifies so it appears 
does the determination of cartels not to be caught. Indeed, cartels are becoming ever 
more sophisticated and better equipped to evade the cartel hunters. It is clear that DG 
Competition  has  used  its  authority  and  powers  to  create  norm  interpreting 
administrative rules which take the form of guidelines, communications, notices and 
letters (see Hofmann, 2006). It was handed weapons to secure its objectives but also 
devised and upgraded its own means to tackle cartels. It has developed and deployed 
simultaneously  both  carrot  and  stick  approaches  to  deter  cartelisation.  The  new 
fining  arrangements  should  prove  invaluable  upgrade  and  will  neither  lead  to 
bankruptcies nor higher prices for consumers as is so often claimed (see Motta, 2008). 
Indeed, the Commission should publicise more widely to a general audience how its 
anti-cartel strategies benefits consumers directly (the benefits of greater competition) 
and indirectly (fines are paid into the EU budget). Ultimately the fact that cartels still 
exist strongly suggest that fines at current levels do not act as sufficient deterrents but 
can  they  go  much  higher  and  further?  Whatever  sanctions  prevail  must  achieve 
`genuine dissuasive effect’ (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2006, 312). Moves towards  
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the criminalisation of cartel activity, and some member states including the UK now 
allow for such sanctions, may yet provide the better, and even the best, deterrent (Wils, 
2008) but it requires similar sanctions across all EU Member States and raises questions 
about the nature and powers of the EU. It will be interesting to see how far the UK 
experience of criminal sanctions in practice will inform discussions within the EU and 
provide political leadership to spearhead this initiative. The issue of criminal sanctions 
for cartel offences is expected to emerge as a `hot’ topic for debate and seems inevitable 
in the medium term.   
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